



# The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Energy Markets

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# Two major questions

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- Does the financial crisis reduce the need for new investment in the energy sector?
- If not, how should regulators promote efficient investment?

# Is now the time to invest?



- Initial instinct:


**Demand ↓**

**Spare capacity**

**Postpone, cancel projects**

Alternative scenarios:

1. WACC↑ but regulated return constant.
2. Project cost includes regulatory “tax”, project could proceed if tax eliminated.



# Is now the time to invest?

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- No change in need for smartgrid investments.
- The financial crisis can even increase the value of new investment:
  - Demand for gas falls disproportionately in southern Europe.
  - Emerging surplus in Spain, Italy.
  - Need to redirect flows.
  - Increases value of new pipelines, regas capacity.
- Changing local/regional merit order can increase value of transmission capacity



# Promoting efficient investment



- The financial crisis has complicated the ability to estimate a reasonable return on investment.
- Most regulators use the Capital Asset Pricing Model:

$$R_e = R_f + \beta \times MRP$$

- There is now great concern concerning all three parameters:  $R_f$ ,  $\beta$  and  $MRP$ .
- Risk of *understating* necessary returns.

# Estimating the cost of capital



- *Betas* for regulated infrastructure have plummeted as investors “fly to safety”.
- Risk of overstating safety:
  - Looking back from today, a 5-year window now has 4 “normal” years and a 1-in-60-year event.
  - Will the next 5 years be the same? Should the 1 crisis year account for 1/5<sup>th</sup> of the beta?
  - Betas after the 1987 crash were not stable: they fell and then they came back up after 1992.




# Possible solutions

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- Estimate beta differently.
  - Examine different data windows.
  - Assign less weight to last year.
- Revisit the market risk premium.
  - Historical data.
  - Consider evidence of increased risk.





# Alternative approach



- Subject fewer projects to traditional rate regulation:
  - Use tender processes for new infrastructure. The tender can set a long-term tariff.
  - Precedent: Ofgem and transmission networks connecting offshore windfarms.
- Revisit policy for exempting new infrastructure from regulated TPA.





# Exemptions to regulated TPA

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- A key advantage to an exemption is that the regulator does not have to estimate:
  - a) demand for the project
  - b) the cost of capital
- Most regulators have wide discretion on granting exemptions.
  - Stipulate conditions that can “tax” a project.
  - At times projects can pay the tax. In a financial crisis it may not be possible.

# Conclusions

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- Time to review how regulation can help/hinder necessary investment.
- The financial crisis requires a serious rethink concerning the cost of capital.
- Also consider two alternatives:
  - Innovative tenders
  - Exemptions from 3<sup>rd</sup> party access.